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MANAGING FOR PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT AND MONITORING
OF CONTRACTS IN THE TRANSIT INDUSTRY
Olga Smirnova, Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf and Suzanne Leland*
ABSTRACT. Public agencies contract out to pursue a variety of goals. But,
these goals cannot be realized if the performance of contractors is not
assessed and monitored. This study examines the state of performance
measurement and contract monitoring in the U.S. transit agencies. We
focus on three research questions: (1) What monitoring capacity exists
within transit agencies? (2) What monitoring methods are used by transit
agencies? (3) What performance measures are tracked by transit agencies?
We find monitoring units are common in a third of agencies in the study.
Service and customer complaints are the most common performance
measures, while penalties and liquidated damages are the most frequent
form of penalties. Finally, we find that transit agencies utilize a variety of
output and outcome measures to monitor contractors.
INTRODUCTION

The last three decades have seen growing emphasis on
performance measurement and management as a mechanism for
ensuring accountability (Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law, & Walker, 2002;
Dubnick, 2005). More recently, interest in performance measurement
has been driven by a number of forces, such as increased citizen
distrust of government, taxpayer revolts, devolution of responsibility
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to lower levels of government, legislative actions to manage spending,
and privatization (Poister, 2008). Yet, while privatization has
contributed to the call for greater accountability, it has complicated
efforts to use performance measurement as a tool.
The growth of contracting out services has led many agencies to
examine how they monitor their contracts in order to maximize their
effectiveness. Scholars have emphasized that when public services
are outsourced, their provision (and performance) needs to be
monitored. Regular tracking and monitoring is a key characteristic of
performance measurement. Public agencies contract out to pursue a
variety of objectives, including achieving cost savings, realizing greater
efficiency, managing risks, and improving service delivery. However,
such contracting may pose risks to government; in several American
examples, contracting has been marked by graft, corruption, and
concerns about service quality (Durant, Girth, & Johnston, 2009;
Keeney, 2007). Furthermore, the benefits of contracts cannot be
realized if the performance of contractors is not assessed and
monitored. Contracting out for services presents challenges to
performance measurement, due largely to information asymmetry and
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by private contractors
(Amirkhanyan, 2011). Government agencies must be smart buyers
and smart managers of contracts (Fossett et al., 2000; Kettl, 1993),
but research on the “hollow state” (Howlett, 2000; Milward & Provan,
2000; Milward, Provan, & Else, 1993) has raised concerns about
government’s ability to manage provision of contracted services.
Milward (1994) noted the irony of contracting in that it is promoted
as the solution to government inefficiency and mismanagement, but
can work well only if the government agency manages the process
effectively. Other researchers have similarly acknowledged the
importance of contract management, and contract monitoring
specifically. Gormley (1994) pointed to the need to monitor to “avoid
unfettered discretion” (p. 231) and to evaluate performance to ensure
that contracts provide the desired outputs and outcomes. Fossett et
al. (2000) suggested that, to be prudent purchasers, government
agencies must be able to specify performance measures, determine if
and how contractors are meeting performance metrics, and hold
contractors accountable for meeting the metrics by sanctioning them
for failure to perform. As Potoski noted, “The pressing question is no
longer whether government should purchase goods and services but
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rather when to purchase and how to manage and regulate purchasing”
(2008, p. S58).
This study analyzes the current state of practice of contract
monitoring and performance measurement in the transit industry. We
utilize data from a survey of transit agencies in the U.S. to examine
contract monitoring practices, including monitoring capacity,
monitoring methods, and performance measures. To supplement the
survey findings and add more depth to our analysis, we also develop
profiles of contract monitoring and performance measurement
practices in ‘typical’ agencies.
CONTRACTING OF TRANSIT SERVICES

We believe that the transit industry provides valuable insight into
performance management of contracts because of the industry’s
contracting history. Public transportation was originally provided by
private companies and over time transitioned to a governmentdominated industry. Eventually, government entities began contracting
with private companies for the delivery of transit services.
State and local governments in the U.S. rely extensively on
contracting for public transit services (rather than in-house provision).
Data from the National Transit Database show that this trend began in
the 1980s, and today, over half of transit agencies contract out.
However, empirical evidence over the last several decades suggests
that cost-savings do not necessarily materialize automatically from
contracting out transit services (Leland & Smirnova, 2009; Perry &
Babitsky, 1986; Smirnova & Leland, 2014; Zullo, 2008). Smirnova and
Leland concluded that public agencies “should pay attention to
monitoring the performance of the contract and should also keep in
mind the challenges of liability, diminished capacity, and some loss of
control over daily operations that might occur during contracting out”
(2014, p. 362).
Nowhere is the reliance on contracting for complex tasks or
services more evident than in the delivery of transit services. In this
study, we examine contract monitoring and performance
measurement practices of transit agencies in the U.S. Specifically, we
focus on three questions:
(1) What monitoring capacity exists within transit agencies?
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(2) What monitoring methods are used by transit agencies?
(3) What performance measures are tracked by transit agencies?
Answering these questions will provide insight into if and how transit
agencies are investing in contract measurement and monitoring
activities.
Challenges of Contracting
Contracts for public service are often underspecified or
incomplete, which may allow opportunistic vendors to exploit contracts
(Brown & Potoski, 2006). Two key challenges faced by government
agencies are: (1) ensuring achievement of contracting goals (e.g. cost
savings, improved service delivery); and (2) ensuring accountability.
Yusuf and O’Connell (2014) suggested the possibility of an
accountability dilemma associated with outsourcing complex
government services; this accountability dilemma drives the need for
greater contract management and oversight. The use of contracting
exacerbates the general challenges of accountability and performance
management. “Even though the actual delivery of public works and
infrastructure may be performed by private sector partners, public
agencies are not exempt from being accountable to their multiple
stakeholders for performance” (Yusuf & Leavitt, 2014, p. 213).
The classical lens used to study and practice contracting is rooted
in principal-agent theory, transaction cost economics, the theory of
market competition, and standard procurement practices (Apte, Apte,
& Rendon, 2011; Fernandez, 2007). Contracts are defined as
“discrete arm’s-length transactions between adversaries with
competing interests” (Fernandez, 2007, p. 1125). Overcoming the
challenges of performance and accountability requires properly
structuring the contractual relationship, reducing information
asymmetry, and limiting contractors’ opportunistic behavior. Public
agencies can do so through several means, such as increasing
competition, specifying contracts precisely and in detail, and rigorously
monitoring contractors’ performance (Brown & Potoski, 2003b, 2003c;
Hefetz & Warner, 2004; Kettl, 1993; Rehfuss, 1990; Romzek &
Johnston, 2002; Savas, 2000, 2002; Seidenstat, 1999). In this paper,
we focus on contract monitoring and performance measurement
practices of transit agencies as mechanisms for holding contractors
accountable.
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Contract Monitoring and Performance Measurement
Effective monitoring of contracts allows government to better
benefit from contracting (Brown & Potoski, 2003b, 2006). During the
evaluation phase of contracting, public agencies require evaluation
capacity to monitor and evaluate the contractor’s performance to
determine if its contract responsibilities are met. “[B]uilding contract
management capacity includes acquiring and nurturing physical
infrastructure, financial resources, and perhaps most important,
human capital” (Brown & Potoski, 2006, p. 325).
As Gormley noted, “Accountability continues to be the Achilles heel
of many contracts” (1994, p. 224). Performance measurement is a
critical element of effective contract accountability, which Romzek and
Johnston defined as when “the state is able to design, implement,
manage, and achieve accountability for its … contract” (2005, p. 237).
For effective contract accountability, monitoring mechanisms must be
in place to provide data for contract evaluation. Strong monitoring
capability contributes to achievement of outputs and outcomes by
allowing the government agency to ensure effective oversight and
assure contract compliance with standards of service provision.
Identifying performance measures and monitoring them allows for
objective assessment of outcomes.
Amirkhanyan (2011) found performance measurement to have a
positive impact on government’s ability to effectively manage
contracts. Specifically, performance measures that included costs,
client impact, service timeliness, service disruptions, and processrelated service delivery measures were associated with accountability
effectiveness. “Rigorous contract monitoring is supposed to improve
success in contracting by identifying instances of inappropriate or
opportunistic behavior on the part of the contractor and by detecting
performance fluctuations and shortfalls” (Fernandez, 2007, p. 1126).
Fossett et al. (2000) pointed to three key components of prudent
purchasing: (1) specifying performance measures; (2) determining if
and how contractors are meeting performance metrics; and (3) holding
contractors accountable by rewarding performance and sanctioning
failure to perform. Our examination of the state of practice of
performance measurement and contract monitoring by transit
agencies will focus on these three components.
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Fernandez (2007) focused on two components of contract
monitoring: monitoring scope or the variety of aspects of performance
that are monitored, and monitoring intensity which is the use of
different monitoring tools and procedures to assess contractor
performance. Yang, Hsieh, and Li (2009) defined evaluation capacity
as: (1) having a formal monitoring system to evaluate whether
contractors have fulfilled the responsibilities specified in the contract;
(2) utilizing monitoring techniques such as filed inspections, periodic
evaluations, and recipient interviews; (3) requiring regular, formal
performance reporting; and (4) monitoring the contracted service
continuously to ensure performance.
Transit agencies seem to acknowledge the need for contract
monitoring and performance measurement. In a 2001 survey of 237
transit agencies that contract transit services, General Managers of the
transit agencies were asked to offer advice to other agencies
considering contracting (Transportation Research Board, 2001). The
top three recommendations were all related to contract administration
and monitoring. First, the managers pointed to the need for specificity
in defining the duties and responsibilities of contractors. Second, they
suggested that well-defined performance standards be included in the
contract, and contractors be rewarded for exceeding standards and
penalized for poor performance. Third, monitoring contract
performance was identified as important. Furthermore, the managers
highlighted “the importance of clearly communicating the agency’s
intention to monitor the work and to hold the contractor responsible for
meeting agreed-upon standards” (p. 126). Subsequent follow-up
interviews underscored the importance of performance monitoring.
Specifying Performance Measures
Poister pointed out that developing performance measurement
systems is relatively straightforward for “production-oriented agencies
with more tangible service delivery systems such as those related to
public works and infrastructure” (2008, p. 18). But, when the public
service landscape is characterized by multiple organizations from
multiple sectors (e.g., government and private) involved in financing,
delivering, and/or managing public infrastructure, it is more difficult to
specify what service providers are to accomplish (Behn & Kant, 1999;
Poister, 2008). Public agencies working with private contractors face
challenges in setting clear objectives and defining appropriate
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performance measures (Kettner & Martin, 1995; Yusuf & Leavitt,
2014).
Another important concern for performance measurement is that
public agencies should define performance broadly enough to cover
the key dimensions of performance (Wholey, 1999).
Multiple
categories of performance measures are available to public agencies,
including inputs, activities, outputs, short-term outcomes, intermediate
outcomes, end outcomes, and impacts (Hatry, 1999; Milward, Provan,
& Else, 1993; Padovani & Young, 2008; Poister, 2008).
Applying the three dimensions of engineering, business, and public
administration to the study of performance in the transportation field,
Baird and Stammer (2000) focused on infrastructure condition and
use; effectiveness, efficiency, and equity; and broader measures
important to societal stakeholders (e.g. mobility, accessibility,
convenience, user satisfaction). Fernandez (2007), in his analysis of
contracting performance, used a multidimensional measure based on
eight indicators: actual cost compared to projected cost; actual cost
compared to in-house service delivery; quality of work; responsiveness
to government’s requirements; timeliness; service continuity;
compliance with the law; and customer satisfaction. For our study of
transit agencies, we explore the key performance indicators public
agencies use when monitoring contracts. We specifically examine the
extent to which transit agencies are using performance measures in
four categories: (1) inputs, (2) process, (3) outputs, and (4) outcomes.
These categories reflect the efficiency and logic models approach. We
also look at whether agencies have a separate contract monitoring
unit. Having a specifically dedicated unit ensures that agencies have
the capacity to monitor contracts (and contractor performance)
regularly and continuously.
Monitoring Performance
Specifying the appropriate metrics is a necessary element of
performance measurement and management. However, if the
measurement information is not used, the effort and cost of the
performance management process will be wasted. The key to
performance management is the periodic measurement of
performance. Therefore, it is necessary for public agencies to monitor
contractors’ performance to determine if and how they are meeting
performance metrics.
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Multiple tools and approaches are available to public agencies for
tracking and monitoring contractors’ performance. Some are directly
related to service delivery, while others are end customer and processoriented. Brown and Potoski (2003a), for example, suggest that public
agency evaluation capacity can include conducting citizen surveys,
monitoring customer complaints, making field observations, and
analyzing operational records.
Transportation agencies, on the whole, have become more focused
on the customer perspective (Stein & Sloane, 2003), relying more on
customer or citizen surveys. For example, state DOTs regularly conduct
user surveys to obtain perceptions of and satisfaction with the
transportation system. Similarly, transit agencies use customer
surveys “to solicit feedback on customers’ perceptions of the reliability,
safety, convenience, and overall quality of the service they provide”
(Poister, 2007, p. 491).
We specifically examine the extent to which transit agencies utilize
four mechanisms to track and monitor contractor performance: (1)
customer satisfaction surveys; (2) levels of service provision; (3)
customer complaints; and (4) secret shoppers.
Holding Contractors Accountable – Rewards and Sanctions
Monitoring contractors’ performance is a costly activity. Case
studies have found that monitoring costs average about 20% of
contracting costs (Pack, 1989; Prager, 1994). Teal (1991), in a study
of contracting in California, found that administrative and monitoring
costs of contracting represented approximately 14% of the contract
amount. Hurwitz (1996), also using a transit contracting case study in
California, found average administrative and monitoring costs of $0.10
to $0.25 per vehicle-mile. Furthermore, as noted by Cooper, rigorous
contract monitoring can become part of a police-oriented approach to
contracting where “the contract manager is viewed as the cop on the
beat preventing bad things from happening” (2003, p. 104). Instead of
enhancing cost savings or improving service quality, such approaches
can potentially “absorb energies that need to be directed toward
service improvement and management innovation” (p. 106).
Therefore, even with rigorous contract monitoring, contract
outcomes may not be achieved. Monitoring can be ineffective if
contractors can game the system or if there are no consequences of
the performance being monitored. “The challenge lies in creating a
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strong linkage between performance measurement and the use of
information to improve performance” (Yusuf & Leavitt, 2014, p. 215).
How the contractor responds to the monitoring system depends upon
the credibility of the system itself and the willingness of the public
agency to enforce punishment (Yang, Hsieh, & Li, 2009).
More specifically, effective monitoring requires that contractors be
incentivized to perform. Incentives are the mechanisms that motivate
contractors and maintain accountability through threat of sanctions.
The use of incentives can counterbalance contractor opportunism
(Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006). Incentives can take two forms: positive
incentives or rewards for satisfactory performance, and negative
incentives or sanctions for unsatisfactory performance. Sanctions,
while not the only way to ensure contractor accountability in
contracting, are one of the most powerful mechanisms to “correct or
penalize performance shortfalls” (Girth, 2014, p. 318). But, the simple
threat of sanction may not sufficiently incentivize contractors. Public
agencies must enforce sanctions for them to be effective.
Lawther and Martin (2014) offer an example of how key
performance indicators can be linked to financial incentives
(availability payments) in a rewards-based performance management
system to improve performance, particularly in the context of
contracting and public-private partnerships. While public agencies
may specify and monitor performance, if they do not act on the
performance information, there will be insufficient incentives for
private contractors to focus on performance. “Once demand risk is
removed from private partners, incentives and sanctions that
accompany the stated performance standards during operations and
maintenance are the only means by which optimal performance can be
ensured” (Lawther & Martin, 2014, p. 230).
In their discussion of contracting for health services, Bennett and
Mills (1998) highlight the role of contractor monitoring and
implementing sanctions for contractor nonperformance as two
important steps in the successful contracting process. These
sanctions may include verbal warnings, reduction of payment or nonpayment to contractors, and even legal proceedings against the
contractor. The public agency must specify the sanctions in the
contract and ensure that sanctions are implemented if the contractor
fails to perform.
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We examine what penalties, incentives, and liquidated damages
are being employed by transit agencies to ensure contractor
performance. We also analyze whether having the internal capacity in
the form of a monitoring unit leads agencies to use a different
incentives structure than those without such a unit.
METHODOLOGY

Our analysis uses data from a biannual survey of transit managers’
perceptions of contracting out. Survey data were collected in 2009,
2011, and 2013. This time period captures the recovery period
following the Great Recession. This unique data was collected using an
Internet-based survey service that provides the privacy for managers
to respond. The survey ensures respondents’ anonymity. The survey
was distributed to all transit agency managers that report to the
National Transit Database with publicly available email addresses
(over 600). The response rate in 2009 was 22.6% (137), 30.7% in
2011 (188), and 36.6% (249).1
The purpose of the surveys were to build upon a previous 2001
study of transit services contracting that was reported in the
Transportation Research Board (TRB) Special Report No. 258,
Contracting for Bus and Demand-responsive Transit Services: A Survey
of U.S. Practice and Experience (Transportation Research Board,
2001). At the time the report was issued, this survey was the only
extensive source of information about contracting out in the transit
industry.
A series of questions were included in the survey to identify the
respondent’s agency characteristics including agency type, services
provided, vehicles operated for bus services, service area, service
population, and region. We also collected extensive information on
transit managers’ perceptions of contracting out, including how they
monitor contracting performance, the duration of contracts, the
number of bidders, the perceptions of contracting, as well as more
specific questions about the agency’s largest contract. In the latter,
we follow TRB’s (2001) practice of identifying the largest contract and
monetary considerations and incentives specified by that contract. For
a large number of agencies, the largest contract is also their only
contract. The distribution of contracts in our study is highly skewed
with the majority of agencies reporting under ten contracts, and the
largest proportion reporting just one contract.
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The following section highlights our results and findings on the
monitoring capacity of transit agencies, the monitoring methods used,
and performance measures tracked by transit agencies. For some
variables (e.g., monitoring methods or performance provisions), we ran
Chi-square tests to identify the differences between agencies with and
without the monitoring units. The Chi-square tests allow us to test
whether the presence of monitoring units and the use of certain
monitoring methods or performance provisions are independent of one
another. Since the test can be applied to categorical variables and the
majority of contracting provisions are not mutually exclusive
categories, we created dichotomous variables for the provisions,
monitoring methods, and monetary provisions where one marks any
case where a category of interest (e.g., penalties) has been used and
zero becomes any case where such category has not been used.
RESULTS

We separate our findings by the three research questions on
monitoring capacity, methods, and performance measures. In addition
to the quantitative descriptions below, we have created typical profiles
for transit agencies of various sizes, with different degrees of
contracting and contract monitoring capacity. Appendix A summarizes
these profiles.
Contract Monitoring Capacity
First, we look at contract monitoring capacity. If an agency has a
specific unit dedicated to monitoring contracts, this ensures that the
agency may have the necessary components of evaluation system as
described by Fernandez (2007) and Yang, Hsieh, and Li (2009). For
example, a separate monitoring unit may make it easier to implement
a formal monitoring system and conduct periodic evaluations. The
monitoring unit does not guarantee the quality of contract evaluations,
but at least provides capacity to regularly review contracts and
contractor performance. The TRB (2001) survey asked the question:
“Does your agency have a specific unit to monitor the performance of
contracted services?” In 2001, 63% of 144 responding transit
agencies indicated having a monitoring unit. The same question was
asked in our 2013 survey and, in contrast, only 37% of 228
respondents indicated that their agency has a monitoring unit. This is
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a surprising and troubling finding because the extent of contracting out
has been increasing in the transit industry since 2001.
In terms of the extent of contracting (as a percentage of services),
as shown in Figure 1, contracting varies depending on whether an
agency has a monitoring unit. In Figure 1, the extent of contracting out
has been broken down into four categories: under 25%, between 25%
and 50%, between 51% and 99%, and 100%. About 74% of agencies
with a monitoring unit contract out 100% of services (top panel), while
55% of agencies without monitoring unit contact out for all services
(bottom panel).2 Zullo (2008) finds partial contracting as not efficient,
and a part of his findings may be attributed to the absence of an
internal monitoring unit for regular evaluation.
FIGURE 1

Extent of Contracting out (% of Services) By Presence of Monitoring
Unit, 2013
1. Extent of contracting for agencies with monitoring unit
under25,
13%
25-50, 5%

51-99, 8%

100, 74%
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2. Extent of contracting for agencies without monitoring unit

under25, 31%
100, 55%
25-50, 10%
51-99, 4%

Additional analysis shows that transit agencies operating in larger
areas are more likely to have a monitoring unit than agencies operating
in smaller areas. Of transit agencies with service areas of populations
less than 100,000 residents, 24% (out of 58) did not have a contract
monitoring unit. In contrast, in medium-sizes areas of population
between 100,000 and 500,000, 34% (out of 116) of transit agencies
had a contract monitoring unit. In larger service areas, with
populations greater than 500,000 residents, 61% (out of 23) of the
transit agencies had a separate unit to monitor contracts.
In the contracts for complex products or products and services with
high asset specificity, there is also an inherent level of uncertainty
about the outcomes. This may create perverse incentives for
contractors, and have been a subject of extensive study on incomplete
contracts (see Guriev & Kvasov, 2005; Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy,
2002, 2007). The presence of a monitoring unit does not guarantee
the quality of contracted services, but does provide the data that may
bridge this uncertainty creating information about the performance
levels. The long-term relationships establishing trust in the incomplete
contracts may be another answer to this problem.
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Contract Monitoring Methods
Besides having a specific unit to evaluate contract performance,
our surveys contained questions on specific contract monitoring
methods. The question about monitoring methods was adopted from
the TRB 2001 survey, which asked: How do you monitor contractor’s
performance? The following options were provided: customer
satisfaction surveys, monitoring the level of service provision,
monitoring the level of customer complaints, secret shoppers, and
other.
There is fairly wide use by transit agencies of methods relying on
the customer perspective, which is consistent with the focus of
transportation agencies as a whole (Stein & Sloane, 2003). For
example, in 2009, customer complaints, results of secret shoppers,
and customer satisfaction surveys are employed by 92%, 40%, and
56% of the responding transit agencies, respectively. Also, a more
objective method based on the level of service provision is the most
commonly used method to monitor contractor performance (about
82% in all years).
The results show that transit agencies rely on a combination of
objective and subjective methods for contractor performance
monitoring. Customer satisfaction surveys conducted at regular
intervals are employed by a large proportion of agencies, but never
relied on as a stand-alone measure. The monitoring of customer
complaints and the monitoring of service provision levels (which can
be done using key performance indicators) are the most frequently
employed measures, usually in combination with others. A smaller
number of agencies employ the use of secret shoppers. Table 1
summarizes the results by year.
The majority of transit agencies employ a combination of methods,
with the most frequent option being the use of all four monitoring
methods. Of those agencies without a monitoring unit, only ten have
implemented all four measures, while 23 agencies with a monitoring
unit have implemented all methods. Table 2 shows monitoring
methods for the agencies with and without monitoring units. The
agencies with monitoring units are more likely to implement all
measures than the agencies without monitoring units, and these
differences are statistically significant as measured by Chi- squares.
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TABLE 1

Methods to Monitor Contractor Performance
2009 (N=50) 2011 (N=74) 2013 (N=110)
Numbers % Numbers % Numbers %
Customer satisfaction surveys
28
56
49
66
72
65
Monitoring level of service
41
82
61
82
90
82
provision
Monitoring complaints
46
92
63
85
99
90
Secret shoppers
20
40
25
34
38
35
Other
12
24
15
20
23
21
Non-mutually exclusive replies
51
86
74
91
99
90
Skipped
2
n/a
15
n/a
17
n/a
Note: The percentages by year do not sum up to 100% because a respondent
can select multiple items. The total number of non-skipped replies was
50 in 2009, 74 in 2011, and 110 in 2013. The question was asked only
of agencies that currently contract out. The lowest question-specific nonresponse rate was in 2009 (4%), and the highest in 2011 (17%).
TABLE 2

Methods Used to Monitor Contractor Performance by Existence of
Monitoring Unit, 2013
Without Monitoring With Monitoring
Unit (N=61)
Unit (N=47)
Numbers
% Numbers %
Customer satisfaction surveys*
26
19
46
60
Monitoring level of service provision*
36
26
60
78
Monitoring complaints*
43
31
56
73
Secret shoppers*
12
9
26
34
Other
11
8
12
16
All four methods
10
7
23
30
Non-mutually exclusive responses
40
29
59
77
Skipped
6
4
8
10
Note: The percentages by year do not sum up to 100% because a respondent
can select multiple items. *Indicates that there is a statistically significant
difference in the monitoring methods for the agencies with and without
monitoring units at 0.05 level, using Chi-square tests. There is no
statistical difference in implementation of the ‘other’ category.
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We believe this illustrates that implementing a variety of
monitoring methods (or increasing the scope of evaluation) is easier
with the presence and guidance of a dedicated contract monitoring
department.
Since effective monitoring requires that contractors be incentivized
to perform, we examined individual contract provisions (for the largest
contract) for fixed route bus services. Table 3 indicates that penalties
and liquidated damages are the most popular performance provisions
in 2013. This is comparable to data reported by the TRB in 2001. In
the TRB survey, 43 agencies reported specifying penalties, 45 included
liquidated damages in contract specification, and 25 included
incentives. Penalties and liquidated damages are negative incentives,
and as such, are utilized to counteract vendor opportunism
(Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006).
TABLE 3

Performance Provisions Specified in the Largest Contract

Penalties
Incentives
Liquidates damages
Other
Non-mutually
exclusive responses
Skipped

2009 (N=40) 2011 (N=53) 2013 (N=81)
Numbers %
Numbers % Numbers %
20 50
32 60
47 58
11 28
17 32
13 16
20
5
18

50
13
45

28 53
4 8
28 53

44
7
36

54
9
44

12 n/a

36 n/a

46 n/a

Note: The percentages are shown for the total non-skipped answers. The
percentages by year do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can
select multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies
that currently contract out. The question specific non-response rate
ranges from 23% in 2009 to about 40% in 2011.

There may be a difference in contract performance provisions
depending on whether or not the agency has a contract monitoring
unit. Over time, a transit agency may acquire additional data on the
scope and quality of contracted services that may help in identifying
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appropriate levels of performance and associated penalties. These
data may not be available for a recent contract. Thus, the
implementation of incentives may be more difficult when there is a lack
of data. When we specifically explore the 2013 data on incentives, we
see that agencies with contract monitoring units employ the bulk of
contractor incentives. In essence, transit agencies with monitoring
units are twice as likely to utilize incentives for their contracts.
Girth (2014) argues that sanctions can be very powerful
mechanisms for ensuring contractor performance. But, these
sanctions must be enforced if they are to be effective. As shown in
Table 4, agencies with a monitoring unit use sanctions (penalties and
liquidated damages) to a greater extent compared to those agencies
without a monitoring unit. This is not surprising, as agencies with
greater monitoring capacity (i.e. have contract monitoring units) are
also more likely to have the capacity to enforce sanctions.
TABLE 4

Negative and Positive Incentives by Existence of a Monitoring Unit,
2013
Without
With Monitoring
Monitoring Unit Unit (N=50)
(N=31)
Numbers %
Numbers %
Penalties*
14
45
33
66
Incentives*
3
10
10
20
Liquidated Damages*
13
42
31
62
Other
5
16
2
4
Non-mutually exclusive responses*
8
26
28
56
Skipped
22
n/a
21
n/a
Note: The percentages are shown from the total non-skipped answers. The
percentages do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can select
multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies that
currently contract out. *Indicates that there is a statistically significant
difference in the incentive use for the agencies with and without
monitoring units at 0.05 level, using Chi-square tests.
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An agency can also specify the incentives structure through
monetary provisions. In our study, such data is available for the
agencies’ largest contract. These monetary arrangements include
market-incentives such as a negotiated rate per unit of service,
vehicles or facilities leases, and reimbursements for operating deficits
(see Table 5). Vehicle leases are usually used in combination with
other monetary arrangements. This may be an indication that the
transit agencies must use specially equipped buses to satisfy
TABLE 5

Monetary Provisions for the Largest Agency Contract
Monetary Provision
Negotiated rate per unit of
service delivered
Cash reimbursement of
some of the seller's
operating deficit
Cash reimbursement of all
of the seller's operating
deficit
Cash reimbursement to
the seller for reduced fare
programs
Vehicles given, sold, or
leased below market value
to the seller
Maintenance facility
leased to the seller
Cash payment to the seller
for specific mass
transportation services
Other
Non-mutually exclusive
responses
Skipped

2009 (N=52)
Numbers %

2011 (N=89)
Numbers

%

2013 (N=127)
Numbers %

35

73

51

80

80

81

1

2

1

2

2

2

3

6

5

8

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

10

10

16

14

14

2

4

6

9

6

6

13

27

11

17

12

12

3

6

7

11

12

12

11

23

19

30

23

23

4 N/A

25 N/A

28 N/A

Note: The percentages are shown from the total non-skipped answers. The
percentages do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can select
multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies that
currently contract out.
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federal requirements such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1991. The highly specific assets make it more difficult for contractors
to enter the market, and such leases may enable contracting. The
most frequently used type is the negotiated rate per unit of service
delivered in combination with some other monetary arrangement.
Several monetary provisions stipulate some form of
reimbursement for the contractors’ deficits. Such provisions may be
easier to negotiate and implement because they do not require the
measurement of service delivery as in the case of, for example, the
negotiated rate per unit of service delivered. However, they are likely
to be less effective as mechanisms to ensure contractor performance
as they transfer to the transit agency some of the risk of
underperformance.
The application of monetary provisions differs between agencies
with and without monitoring units (2013 survey, see Table 6). Among
those who responded to both questions, there are slightly more
agencies that both have a monitoring unit and use a negotiated rate
per unit of service. In fact, almost 80% of agencies who use this
technique have a monitoring unit (45 out of 57). This is an indication
that the presence of monitoring units allows agencies to implement
performance measurement at a different level. The presence of a
monitoring unit may facilitate the implementation of penalties or
incentives, or application of a negotiated rate per service delivered
because these provisions require an agency to track specific
performance measures.
TABLE 6

Monetary Provisions by Monitoring Units, 2013
Without
With
Monitoring
Monitoring
Unit (N=42)
Unit (N=57)
Numbers % Numbers %
Negotiated rate per unit of service
delivered*
Cash reimbursement of some of the
seller's operating deficit
Cash reimbursement of all of the
seller's operating deficit

35

83

45

79

2

5

0

0

1

2

1

2%
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TABLE 7 (Continued)

Without
With
Monitoring
Monitoring
Unit (N=42)
Unit (N=57)
Numbers % Numbers %
Cash reimbursement to the seller for
reduced fare programs
Vehicles given, sold, or leased below
market value to the seller
Maintenance facility leased to the
seller
Cash payment to the seller for specific
mass transportation services
Other*
Non-mutually exclusive responses
Skipped

0

0

0

0

8

19

6

11

2

5

4

7

6

14

6

11

4
11
13

10
26
N/A

8
14
10

14
20
N/A

Note: The percentages are shown from the total non-skipped answers. The
percentages do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can select
multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies that
currently contract out. *Indicates that there is a statistically significant
difference in the incentive use for the agencies with and without
monitoring units at 0.05 level, using Chi-square tests. The other monetary
provisions are either not statistically significant or the Chi-square test
cannot be applied (cash reimbursement of some of the seller's operating
deficit, cash reimbursement of all of the seller's operating deficit, cash
reimbursement to the seller for reduced fare programs, and maintenance
facility leased to the seller) due to the low expected count.

Performance Measures
Our 2013 survey includes the open-ended question: “What key
performance indicators do you use for monitoring your contracts?”
Table 7 lists the top performance indicators used by transit agencies
in the 2013 survey. On-time performance was by far the most popular
response with over half of all agency managers reporting the use of
this measure. The number of customer complaints was second (25%).
Ridership costs, missed trips, accidents, and maintenance logs and
costs were cited fewer than 10% of the time by respondents.
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TABLE 8

Top Ten Most Frequently Cited Performance Indicators, 2013
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

On-time performance
Number of complaints
Ridership costs
Missed trips/ Breakdowns/ Road calls
Accidents
Maintenance logs/ Costs
Ridership
Miles between road calls
Budget adherence/ Cost containment
Safety

Only a few agencies used ridership numbers, miles between road calls,
budget adherence of the contractor and safety. Other, less frequently
cited performance measures, included operator courtesy, driver
citations, and number of passengers left on the side of the road. One
transit agency reported that measures were under development, and
another that it uses measures required by its regional authority. A few
agencies did not use any performance measures to monitor contracts
or were not sure of the measures used. Two respondents simply stated
“the standard measures” or “the standard twelve measures.”3
We can also classify the types of performance measure utilized by
transit agencies in 2013 using Hatry’s (1999) framework of input,
process, outputs, and outcomes. As shown in Table 8, most
performance measures are outputs and outcomes. The most popular
measure – on-time performance – is an outcome measure used by
about half of the agencies. Fewer agencies used accidents and
customer satisfaction as performance measures. Only one input
measure, operating costs, is used frequently in the transit industry for
contracts.
Profiles of Contract Monitoring and Performance Measurement in
Practice
The purpose of this study is to better understand the current state
of practice of contract monitoring and performance measurement as it
applies to transit agencies. Our survey results indicate that some
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TABLE 9

Performance Measures Utilized by Transit Agencies by Type, 2013
Input
Measures
Operating
Costs

Process Measure

Output
Measures
Budget Adherence/Cost Number of
Containment
Complaints
Vehicle Maintenance
Ridership
logs/Costs
Ridership Costs
Miles between
Road Calls
Trip Denials

Outcome
Measures
On-time
Performance
Safety
Customer
Satisfaction

contract monitoring capacity exists but that there is variation across
the agencies in terms of how contracts are monitored and performance
is measured. To contextualize our findings and improve understanding
of the state of current practice, we also developed profiles of ‘typical’
agencies. We did so by analyzing results of the 2013 survey and
conducting an extensive analysis of transit agencies’ websites. These
profiles are organized by size of service area, extent of contracting, and
presence of monitoring unit. These profiles illustrate differences in
contract management capacity and use of methods and metrics across
different types of transit agencies. The profiles are briefly discussed
below and summarized in Appendix A.
We have separated the transit agencies into three groups: small
agencies (serving populations under 100,000), medium-size agencies
(serving populations over 100,000 up to 499,000), and large agencies
(serving populations over 500,000 and under one million). Only a
small number of agencies serve populations over one million, and
these agencies operate in very unique environments. In each group,
we separated cases by the presence of a monitoring unit, and selected
cases representing typical responses. For example, a typical small
agency with a monitoring unit will contract out 80-100% of the services,
while a typical small agency without a monitoring unit will contract out
under 25% or almost all (100%) of their services. The typical mediumsized agency tends to contract out under 25% of services or 100% of
services, and the typical large agency tends to contract out 100% of its
services, regardless of whether a contract monitoring unit is present.
In terms of monetary arrangements, agencies with monitoring units
(regardless of size) tend to implement more complex structures
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compared to those without monitoring units. Smaller agencies also
tend to use a wider range of performance measures, while larger
agencies tend to utilize a broader array of monitoring methods.
Agency 1: Small Agency, Contracts Out 80%, Has a Monitoring Unit
This is a city-run agency that contracts out for bus and paratransit,
primarily to use union labor. By state law, the agency cannot bargain
with the union: therefore, the city contracts with a management
company. The agency has a specific unit to monitor contract
performance and contracts out about 80% of its bus service. It
contracts for service delivery, maintenance and security. The agency
typically has three bidders and bids the contract out every three years.
The agency monitors contractor performance with customer
satisfaction surveys, monitoring of level of service provision,
monitoring of complaints, and secret shoppers. With the agency's
largest contract for bus services, the same vendor has been used for
six years. Penalties for lack of performance and cash reimbursement
of all of the vendor's operating deficit are included in the contract.
Agency 2: Small Agency, Contracts 100%, Has No Monitoring Unit
This agency is a single purpose government that provides multiple
modes of transportation including bus service, demand response, and
paratransit. It contracts out 100% of its bus services at a negotiated
rate per unit of service delivered and have operated the same contract
for 13 years. While the agency does not have a monitoring unit, it uses
customer satisfaction surveys, monitors the level of service provision,
monitors complaints, and uses secret shoppers. Key performance
indicators used are on-time percentage, passengers per hour, miles
between road calls, miles between accidents, and missed trips. It
monitors the largest contract by imposing a program of penalties and
incentives if the contractor’s performance fails to meet certain
minimum targets. However, the manager notes that the agency has
never had to impose penalties.
Agency 3: Medium Size Agency, Contracts Out 100%, Has a
Monitoring Unit
This is a city-run agency that only operates one mode: buses. It has
contracted out all (100%) bus services since 1999. The most recent
contract has been in place for 14 years. It has a monitoring unit and

MANAGING FOR PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT AND MONITORING OF CONTRACTS

231

uses on-time performance, customer comments, and operating costs
as performance metrics. The agency uses negotiated rate per unit of
service delivered and the contract specifies liquidated damages.
Agency 4: Medium Size Agency, Contracts 2.6 Percent (Partial
Contractor), Has No Monitoring Unit
This is a single purpose government agency that currently
contracts out for bus service (only a small percentage of services,
2.6%), and provides demand response and ADA paratransit. It started
contracting out around 1984, but only contracts out because of peak
demand times. The agency does not have a monitoring unit and has
had just one contract over a five year period. It currently monitors
performance by the level of service provision, complaints and secret
shoppers. Only one key performance indicator is used: on-time
performance. The agency uses negotiated rate per unit of service
delivered because it allows more flexibility in funding services at
different levels. With the only contract, the agency uses penalties and
incentives as performance provisions.
Agency 5: Large Agency, Contracts Out 20%, Has a Monitoring Unit
This agency, a city municipal corporation, operates bus service and
contracts out for 20% of its services, customer call center and retail
store. The agency has contracted out since 2004. The agency has a
monitoring unit and uses negotiated rate per unit of service delivery for
monetary considerations. Performance monitoring includes customer
satisfaction surveys, tracking level of service provision and client
complaints, and holding routine performance meetings with the
vendor. Key performance metrics are on-time performance and
customer service complaints.
Agency 6: Large Agency, Contracts Out 45%, Has No Monitoring Unit
This single purpose government agency currently provides bus
service and contracts about 45% of bus service for three years with two
one-year options available. The agency does not have a monitoring
unit but uses on-time performance, number of breakdowns and
customer satisfaction to monitor contracts. Its largest contract uses
the following monetary considerations: negotiated rate per unit of
service delivered, and vehicles given, sold, or leased below market
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value to the vendor. Penalties, incentives, and liquidated damages are
the performance provisions included in the contract.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Smirnova and Leland (2014) found that reliance on outsourcing by
transit agencies is driven more by path-dependent behaviors than the
current fiscal climate. The implications, then, are “that public
administrators, and particularly transit agency managers, need to
choose wisely when deciding whether to contract out for services
because the decision will seldom be revisited, even during a
recessionary period” (Smirnova & Leland, 2014, p. 362). This
highlights the need to monitor contractors to ensure performance and
to hold contractors accountable for their performance.
Contracting out for complex products and services represents
certain challenges such as measuring performance and setting
accountability standards. Yusuf and O’Connell (2014) and Yusuf and
Leavitt (2014) underscore the importance of contract management
and oversight to improve accountability. This study examines the state
of the practice of contract monitoring and performance measurement
by transit agencies in the US during 2009, 2011, and 2013. The
findings indicate that just over a third of transit agencies reported
having a special monitoring unit for contracts in the 2013 survey. The
presence of contract monitoring units also varies with the extent of
contracting and size of the service area. A larger percentage of
agencies with monitoring units, contract out all of their services than
those without monitoring units. Monitoring service and customer
complaints are the most frequently used performance measures in the
industry. Penalties and liquidated damages are the most frequently
used negative incentives. Agencies with monitoring units employ twice
as many incentives as agencies without monitoring units. Finally, we
find that transit agencies utilize a wide variety of output and outcome
measures to monitor contractors.
Our results are fairly consistent with other studies of contract
management in public agencies in terms of the relatively low use of
contract monitoring and performance measurement. Focusing on
contracting for services by the U.S. Navy, Apte, Apte, and Rendon
(2011) found that only 25% perceived the level of contract monitoring
and oversight to be appropriate. Previous studies have also found a
wide range of measures used to monitor contractor performance. In a
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comprehensive study of contracting by local governments in the U.S.,
the average local government collected five (out of eight) types of
contractor performance data4 (Fernandez, 2007). Using a similarlyconstructed sample, Brown and Potoski (2003a) examined local
government contract evaluation capacity and found that 52% of local
governments reported using specific techniques (e.g. monitoring
citizen complaints, conducting citizen survey and field observations,
etc.) to systematically evaluate contractor’s service delivery. In a study
of public bus transit contracting, performance provisions were found to
be included in some transit contracts (Shetterly, 2002) - positive
incentives (sharing of cost savings) and negative incentives
(deductions for non-performance) were used by 13% and 35% of the
jurisdictions in the sample, respectively.
This study was intended to provide a survey to better understand
the current state of practice of contract monitoring and performance
measurement of transit agencies. As such, our analysis focused solely
on the current state of practice of contract monitoring and
performance measurement. This examination is an important first
step in understanding how transit and other public agencies manage
their contracts effectively to ensure the goals of outsourcing are
achieved. From this study, we know that some contract monitoring
capability, in the form of dedicated contract monitoring unit, does exist
in transit agencies. We also know that transit agencies are utilizing
performance measurement to track contractor performance along
multiple dimensions such as process, outputs, and outcomes.
Furthermore, some transit agencies are rewarding and/or sanctioning
contractors based on their performance. We have some indication that
monitoring scope and intensity vary by the extent to which the transit
agencies contract for services. In terms of prudent purchasing
prescribed by Fossett et al. (2000), there appears to be variation not
only in the capacity to be prudent purchasers, but also in the
implementation of prudent purchasing practices. Almost all of the
transit agencies responding to our survey specify contract monitoring
and performance measures, but not all agencies have the ability to
identify if the contract requirements are being met, and reward a highly
performing vendor or sanction an underperforming one.
However, our study raises additional questions that are important
for a broader understanding of effective contract management. Future
research should continue this stream of study by examining contract
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monitoring and performance measurement in more depth both in the
transit industry and for other government services. For example,
contract monitoring and performance measurement are, in theory,
necessary for ensuring contract fulfillment and that the needs of the
contracting agency are met. But, to what extent do they contribute to
a successful contracting experience? More specifically, does contract
monitoring and performance measurement lead to cost savings and
improved service delivery? Additionally, why do some transit agencies
have greater contract monitoring capabilities than others? What
factors drive transit agencies to have greater monitoring scope and/or
intensity? Furthermore, some questions arise regarding specific
differences in terms of practices across agencies. For example,
penalties and liquidated damages are used to a greater degree by
transit agencies with monitoring units, compared to those without
monitoring units. What factors account for this difference? These
sanctions - penalties and liquidated damages – also seem to be used
more extensively compared to positive incentives. What may account
for this popularity, and why are some types of incentives more popular
than others?
These are some questions that can, and should be, addressed in
future research.
Research may also be needed to examine
interactions between the extent of contracting, contract monitoring,
and contracting performance. Zullo (2007), for example, found partial
contracting to be less efficient than complete outsourcing. Could this
relationship between extent of contracting and efficiency be mediated
by contract monitoring capability, where those agencies that contract
to a lesser degree also rely less on contract monitoring and
performance measurement? Furthermore, some questions arise
regarding specific differences in terms of practices across agencies.
For example, penalties and liquidated damages are used to a greater
degree by transit agencies with monitoring units, compared to those
without monitoring units. What factors account for this difference?
These sanctions - penalties and liquidated damages – also seem to be
used more extensively compared to positive incentives. What may
account for this popularity, and why are some types of incentives more
popular than others?
Our focus on transit agencies was driven by the high reliance on
contracting within the transit industry. However, contracting is
prevalent in other government functions and various other government
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agencies rely extensively on contractors to provide key public service
deliveries. The growth in what can be viewed as multi-sector service
delivery – involving government agencies, non-profit organizations,
and private contractors – has placed greater emphasis on the need to
understand how to better manage the delivery of services that involve
actors from multiple sectors. Our study, while limited to government
use of contracting by private firms, moves our understanding forward
by providing the ‘lay of the land’ in terms of current practices. By
knowing the current state of the practice we can better understand
where we need to be in the future.
NOTES

1. Our analysis focuses on the subset of the survey respondents
(transit agencies) that contract out.
2. The agencies with monitoring units contract out 100% of their
service more often than the agencies without monitoring units. The
differences are statistically significantly (Chi-square 4.19, p<0.05)
for agencies contracting out 100% services vs. all other agencies.
There is not any statistical difference for agencies contracting
under 25% of their services or contracting out 51-99% of their
services. The expected counts are smaller than 5 (making Chisquare an inappropriate test) for the contracting 25-50% of
services category.
3. The number and variety of standard measures may differ
somewhat from state to state. For example, the Florida
Department of Transportation uses 16 various standard measures
of effectiveness, 23 for efficiency, and 29 general performance
indicators. The National Transit Database lists annual revenue
miles and hours, vehicles available for maximum services, peak-tobase ratio, operating expense per vehicle revenue mile, operating
expense per vehicle revenue hour, operating expense per
passenger mile or unlinked passenger trip, and unlinked
passenger trips per revenue mile or per revenue hour.
4. The eight types are: work inputs, work processes, work outputs,
timeliness, cost, accuracy of invoicing, legal compliance, and
complaints.
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APPENDIX A

Profiles of “Typical” Transit Agencies’ Contract Monitoring and
Performance Measurement
Monitoring unit
No monitoring unit
Small Agency Size (population under 100,000)
Extent of contracting 80-100%
100% or under 25%
Monetary
negotiated rate per unit negotiated rate per unit
Arrangements
of service delivered alone of service delivered with
or cash payment for
some other provision
specific services alone
Monitoring contracts customer satisfaction
monitor the level of
through
surveys, monitoring level service provision and
of service provision,
monitor complaints
monitoring complaints
Performance
on time percentage,
on time percentage,
measures:
passengers per hour,
passengers per hour,
miles between road calls, miles between road calls,
miles between accidents miles between accidents
and missed trips as key and missed trips as key
performance indicators
performance indicators
Medium Agency Size (population between 100,000 and 499,000)
Extent of contracting 100% or under 25%
100% or under 25%
Monetary
negotiated rate per unit of negotiated rate per unit
Arrangements
service delivered or cash of service delivered or
payment for specific
cash payment for specific
services usually with some services usually with
other provision
some other provision
Monitoring contracts customer surveys,
customer complaints and
through
monitoring level of service surveys
provision, monitoring
complaints
Performance
on-time performance,
on-time performance,
measures:
customer complaints
customer complaint
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
Monitoring unit
No monitoring unit
Large Agency Size (population between 500,000 to under 1 million)
Extent of contracting 100%
100%
Monetary
negotiated rate per unit of negotiated rate per unit
Arrangements
service delivered and
of service delivered
other provisions
**varies by agency
Monitoring contracts customer satisfaction
customer satisfaction
through
surveys, monitoring the
surveys, monitoring the
level of service provision, level of service provision,
monitoring complaints,
monitoring complaints,
secret shoppers
secret shoppers
Performance
on-time performance,
on-time performance,
measures:
customer complaints
customer complaints
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